We examine the relative improvement in forecasting accuracy of the Federal Reserve (Greenbook forecasts) and private-sector forecasts
Introduction
Christina Romer and David Romer (2000) and Christopher Sims (2002) show that the Federal Reserve's staff forecasts of inflation are superior to the forecasts produced by commercial forecasters in the private sector 1 . Independent of those studies, there has been a number of studies showing that the economy experienced a Great Moderation starting around the mid-1980s 2 . Coinciding with that Great Moderation, the forecastability of the economy changed as well. The overall volatility of inflation has dropped, and therefore, in one sense, it is easier to forecast the average rate of inflation. But the bulk of that drop in volatility appears to have come from a drop in the volatility of the predictable component of inflation (Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) , Stock and Watson (2007) ). As a result, the marginal contribution of forecasters has dropped sharply since the mid-1980s. Referring to the post-1984 period, Stock and Watson (2007, p. 4) state "it has become much more difficult for an inflation forecaster to provide value added beyond a univariate model."
1 Romer and Romer (2000) and Sims (2002) also look at the Fed's forecast errors for real output growth. The Fed's advantage in terms of real output growth forecasts appears to be smaller and less robust across forecast horizons. In an earlier version of this paper we examined the Fed's real output growth forecast errors and found similar results: the Fed did not have a clear forecast advantage across all forecast horizons prior to the Great Moderation. Therefore, the contrast between the Fed's relative forecast advantage pre-and post-Great Moderation is smaller. These results are available from the authors upon request. 2 Although most studies focus on the decline in output variability (see Bernanke (2004) , McConnell and PerezQuiros (2000) , Kim, Nelson, Piger (2004) , Stock and Watson (2003) and Blanchard and Simon (2001) ) Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002) find a break in inflation volatility in the mid-1980s as well.
We investigate whether the change in inflation forecastability that coincided with the Great Moderation has caused the Fed's forecasting advantage to decline relative to the private sector. To the extent that the Fed had an advantage in forecasting prior to the Great Moderation, that advantage was limited to the predictable component of inflation. We therefore hypothesize that the decline in the volatility of the predictable component of inflation has lead to a decline in the Fed's forecasting advantage as well. We also investigate whether there has been further decline in the Fed's relative forecasting advantage since the Fed moved toward greater transparency starting in 1994 since greater transparency provides information to the private sector.
We test these hypotheses by comparing the Federal Reserve's Greenbook forecast errors to two sets of private-sector forecast errors: The Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and the Blue Chip Economic Indicators (BC) as well as a naïve forecast represented by the lagged value of inflation (random walk). We find that the Fed's forecasting advantage remains but the size of their advantage has declined significantly. Specifically, the gap between the Fed's forecast errors and the private sector's forecast errors has declined. In addition, the decline in the predictable part of inflation implies that the naïve (random walk) model produces forecasts that are statistically indistinguishable from the Fed's after 1994.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 compares the Fed's root mean squared forecast errors (RMSE) over various sub-samples with the RMSEs from the private sector and naïve forecasts. Section 5 looks at whether the Fed's relative forecast errors have changed over various sub-samples.
Section 6 looks at whether the Fed forecasts contain information not contained in private sector and naïve forecasts. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
Using data spanning the late 1960s through the early to mid 1990s, Romer and Romer (2000) and Sims (2002) show that the Federal Reserve is "better" at forecasting inflation. By "better" they mean specifically: 1) the Fed's Greenbook forecasts have lower root mean squared errors (RMSE) than the private sector and 2) given the Fed's Greenbook forecast, private sector forecasts have little or no additional explanatory power for inflation. Romer and Romer (2000, p. 437) attribute the Fed's forecasting advantage to the fact that the "Federal Reserve commits far more resources to forecasting than even the largest commercial forecasters." Similarly, Sims' (2002) suggests two reasons for the Fed's forecasting advantage.
The first is that the Fed has knowledge of its own likely policy actions and the second is that the Fed is better at collecting detailed information about current and recent movements in the economy. Sims empirical results are consistent with both explanations. Faust and Wright (2007) test Sims' second conjecture and find that for inflation, the Fed's forecasting advantage does not appear to stem from their ability to collect detailed information about the economy. Their results leave open the possibility that the Fed's forecasting advantage arises from its knowledge of its own policy actions or some other source such as superior modeling.
In a separate line of research, Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) and Stock and Watson (2007) examine changes in the forecastability of inflation after the onset of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s. Atkeson and Ohanian find that the coefficient on unemployment in the short-run Phillips curve is significantly negative over the sample . After 1983 they find that the coefficient on unemployment in the short-run Phillips curve drops to zero implying that inflation is best forecasted with a random walk model. Stock 
Data
In the empirical work that follows we compare the forecast errors from the Fed's Greenbook to the forecast errors generated by the median forecast from the SPF, the mean forecast from the BC and the naïve forecast. 
RMSE Comparison
Our purpose in this section is to compare the RMSEs for the Fed, SPF, BC and naïve forecasts of inflation over various sub-samples. The tests presented in this section address whether the Fed has a forecasting advantage relative to these comparison forecasts in any of the sub-samples but not across sub-samples. Section 5 addresses whether the size of the forecasting advantage has changed significantly across the various sub-samples. Tables 1 through 3 show the RMSEs for (2000)) and 1994 (the date at which the Fed began announcing its policy changes immediately following FOMC meetings). We employed the modified Diebold-Mariano test statistic to test whether the forecast errors (RMSE)
were different across forecasters.
8 Table 1 compares the RMSEs of the Fed and the SPF. Overall, the results suggest that the Fed has significantly lower forecast errors compared to the SPF. Moreover, the Fed's forecast advantage holds in both the pre-and post-Great Moderation sub-samples, indicating that the Fed was able to maintain lower errors even though the volatility of the predictable component of inflation dropped after the Great Moderation making it "harder" to forecast inflation.
The post-announce period provides some evidence that the Fed's advantage may have narrowed. At the 0, 1 and 2 quarter ahead horizons, the Fed's errors were no longer significantly 7 All samples end at 2001 because the Greenbook forecasts are available with a 5-year lag.
8 According to Harvey, Leybourne and Newbold (1997) , the unmodified Diebold-Mariano test statistic is "quite seriously oversized for moderate number of observations." They suggest the following modification which results in an improvement in the behavior of the test statistic for moderately-sized samples: smaller than the SPF's and at the 3 and 4 quarter horizon, the Fed's errors are only marginally smaller than the SPF's. However, the lack of significance may be due to the small sample (23 observations). In addition, the result for the combined horizons (0-4) indicate that the Fed did have significantly smaller errors overall during the post-announce period and the ratio RMSE SPF /RMSE Fed is similar in size to the combined-horizon ratios for the pre-GM and preannounce periods. (2001) and Stock and Watson (2007) in the sense that the Fed's value added relative to the naïve forecast has narrowed, if not dissappeared.
Relative Forecast Errors
The narrowed and if yes, the gap has narrowed in a statistically significant way and on average using private sector forecasts will be closer to the Fed's Greenbook forecast than in the earlier time period. Formally, we define the forecast error gap as follows:
where comparison error is either the SPF, BC or naïve forecast error. Tables 4 through 6 show the value of gap t for various sub-samples. The third column reports the modified Diebold-Mariano test statistic for the null hypothesis that the gap was unchanged across the sample break. Table 4 Furthermore, the drop in the gap was larger after the 1984 split compared to the post 1994 period. Table 6 suggest that the Fed's forecasting advantage with respect to the naïve forecast narrowed after the mid-1990s. Tables 1 through 6 . In all cases, the RMSEs for both the Fed 10 The RMSEs used in these figures were computed by taking the square root of the 4-quarter moving average of the squared forecast errors. and the comparison forecast declined over the sample. In addition, the gap (measured by the vertical distance between the two lines) narrowed, especially in the late 1990s.
Do Fed Inflation Forecasts Contain Additional Information?
The above comparisons of RMSEs and absolute forecast errors can be thought of as unconditional forecast comparisons. In this section we follow the empirical methodology used by Fair and Shiller (1989) as well as Romer and Romer (2000) 
where subscript h is the forecast horizon. If 1  = 0 then forecast 1 has no additional information that is not contained in forecast 2 and if 2  = 0 then forecast 2 has no additional information that is not contained in forecast 1.
In tables 7 through 9 we present the results of our estimations of equation 2 over various sub-samples. The results for the SPF (table 7) suggest a narrowing of the Fed's forecasting advantage with respect to inflation. As was the case in our earlier tests, the narrowing appears to have taken place well after the onset of the Great Moderation. The estimates reported in table 7 show that the Fed's forecasts did not provide additional information given the SPF's forecasts of inflation after 1994, but as was the case with our analysis of RMSEs, this result may be due to the small sample (23 observations).
The results reported in table 8 for the Blue Chip are less consistent across horizons. The
Fed apparently has lost an edge at horizons 3 and 4 and overall (horizons 0-4 combined) but still retains an informational advantage at the short horizons (0-2). Table 9 shows the information content of the Fed's forecasts relative to the naïve forecasts. The Fed's forecasts contain information in all samples at all horizons except for the post-1994 sample, horizons 3 and 4 which is consistent with the BC results.
The overall fit (R 2 ) of these regressions declined after 1994, particularly at horizons 3 and 4. This is consistent with Stock and Watson (2007) who found that the variation in the predictable component of inflation declined after the Great Moderation.
Conclusion
Romer and Romer (2000) and Sims (2002) Gavin and Mandal (2001) and Romer and Romer (2008) for detailed analyses of these forecasts. 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1997 1998 1999 
